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I. Introduction
In the aftermath of World War II, the victors of the war determined that to avoid a repeat
of the aggressive and systematic violation of human rights, a new foundation for states'
conduct required an affirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights."' In this wave of
remorse and idealism, they created the United Nations and its charter, now considered the
foundation for international human rights law.' Although the charter firmly upheld the
sanctity of territorial integrity, it warned that this protection would not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures to uphold the purposes and principles of the
United Nations2
The charter's provision for the promotion of international human rights were strength-
ened through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two human rights cov-
enants, generally referred to as the International Bill of Rights. 4 Furthermore, the inter-
national community broadened its reach to enforce human rights law and provided for
universal jurisdiction for perpetrators of genocide and grave breaches of humanitarian law.'
*Yvonne C. Lodico, J.D., MIA, LL.M., is an attorney specializing in public international law. Ms. Lodico
resides in New York and in Melbourne, Australia, and has served with the United Nations in the secretariat
and on four U.N. peacekeeping missions: two in Angola, one in Mozambique, and one in South Africa. She is
also a director of a company called Peace Strategies, Inc., which operates an organization assisting the civil
society's peace and reconciliation movement in Angola. This article is based on a presentation given at the
University of Pennsylvania in March 2000 at a conference titled Human Rights in Africa.
1. U.N. CHARTER preamble, para.2.
2. See INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS 118-21 (HenryJ. Steiner
& Philip Altson eds., 1996).
3. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43. See also Steiner & Alston, supra note 2, at 122. The charter justifies human
rights as a state value by linking it to peace and security.
4. See Steiner & Alston, supra note 2, at 121. See alsoJAcK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
& PRACTICE 27 (1989). Human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and this context is
universal. Cf RICHARD FALK, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROss-CuLTUR,AL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 45 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed.,
1992) (suggesting an intermediate approach between universalistic approach and cultural relativism).
5. G.A. Res. 260(A), U.N. GAOR, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
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Thus, human rights protections began an ascendance that went beyond territorial borders
and sovereign abuses therein. States became bound to protect basic human rights of their
citizens, through either treaty or customary law, and these protections could be enforced
when their violations jeopardized peace and security in the international system.
Despite this progression in international law, actual state practice did not evolve in the
same fashion. Instead, priority for state actions was the effect on the political paradigm of
dynamics of the Cold War and the balance of power between the West and the East. This
political necessity thwarted any cohesive U.N. Security Council actions that could be taken
to ensure protections of human rights, particularly actions requiring the use of force.
With the end of the Cold War came declarations for a new world order, a renewed
optimism for the United Nations, and a will for cooperation within the Security Council.
In the early 1990s, this will enabled the Security Council to approve humanitarian inter-
ventions to protect the Kurdish people and to end starvation in Somalia. Regrettably, the
enforcement action in Somalia, though meeting its first humanitarian objective to provide
food aid, changed the American perspective for enforcement action after the tragic death
of eighteen U.S. soldiers.
Although the military intervention in Somalia saved lives, 6 its achievements diminished
as the United States and the United Nations sought to eradicate the underlying reasons for
the intervention without sufficient coordination and resources. Even though the motivation
for the intervention emerged from essentially moral and humanitarian imperatives (that is,
to prevent further starvation and to save lives), the mission became increasingly complex
as it sought to enforce peace and to coordinate with a multinational U.N. force.7 Unfor-
tunately, when Somali clan forces murdered American soldiers, a terrible scar remained
that influenced the criteria for future humanitarian interventions, particularly for interven-
tions in Africa. The lack of will to take even preemptory action in Rwanda in 1994,8 let
alone a military intervention, resulted in one of the fastest genocide rates in recorded his-
tory.9 Former President Bill Clinton acknowledged the mistake of not taking a greater role
in preventing the killings of the Tutsis.10 Also, the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
conceded that member states were reluctant to place soldiers in harm's way because there
were no perceived vital interests at stake and because there were concerns over costs and
doubts for success in the wake of Somalia." The guilt from the resulting genocide influ-
enced the policy decision for the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti and created incentives to
draw up a peace plan to stop the genocide in Bosnia.
Since Somalia, the United States has adopted a more pragmatic approach to multilateral
6. See Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, in LEARNING
FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 239, 252 (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey
Herbst eds., 1997).
7. See Jonathan T. Howe, Relations between the United States and United Nations in Dealing with Somalia, in
LEARNING FROM SOMALIA, supra note 6, at 173-74. See also Clarke & Herbst, supra note 6, at 173-74, 246. In
Somalia there was no clear vision as to how the reconciliation would proceed. It did not acknowledge that the
intervention would later implicate it in the depths of Somali politics nor did it have the long-term will to make
the requisite changes. See id. at 252.
8. See Stephen Walt, Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 77 (Mar./Apr. 2000).
9. See Allan J. Kuperman, Rwanda in Retrospect, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 94, 98 (Jan./Feb. 2000).
10. See id.
11. See James F. Miskel, Some Lessons about Humanitarian Intervention, available at www.jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/c/
c117.htm, at 1.
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interventions rather than just being compelled to end starvation. 2 In general, in addition
to a severe humanitarian crisis, there now must be a major security interest at stake; there
must be almost a guarantee of total victory, minimal casualties, and a clear exit strategy. 3
After Somalia, U.S. guidelines for humanitarian intervention made it possible not only for
the United States to stay on the sidelines; it also created a disincentive for others from
getting involved.
Despite the initial enthusiasm of the early 1990s for creating a new world order, recent
experiences and new realities shape the post-Cold War power paradigms within the Security
Council. Cohesiveness cannot be taken for granted, especially when there are historical
geo-political ties.' 4 The strategies that led to the military intervention in Kosovo exemplify
this situation. Although the Security Council had issued declarations condemning the hu-
man rights violations in Kosovo, it could not have approved an intervention because of the
likelihood of a Russian veto. Nevertheless, due to the will to intervene, the United States
and west European forces found an appropriate mechanism through the structure of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).' 5
In a macabre coincidence, the humanitarian tragedy in Sierra Leone occurred about the
same time as the decision to bomb Kosovo. 16 Although the rebels' rampage in Freetown
killed as many people in just a few days as the Serbs killed in one year in Kosovo, the
international community did not undertake any NATO-like response. 7
In addition, in the case of East Timor, despite evidence of widespread human rights
violations, Indonesia's approval of an intervention was considered necessary regardless of
the fact that under international law it may not have even been necessary.' s Once received,
however, an intervention force was successfully deployed and an extensive peacekeeping
and capacity building mission followed this force.
As the chronology of humanitarian interventions since 1990 indicates, authorization for
military interventions has been selective. In general, moral outrage is not necessarily
enough, particularly if there are no important strategic interests. The United States and
presumably other major western powers may be disinclined to intervene without strong
12. See Howe, supra note 7, at 174. In contrast, the military intervention in Kuwait was in response to the
Iraqi invasion and the vital interests of the Western world.
13. See ALTON FRYE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, CRAFTING A WORK-
ABLE DOCTRINE: THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS MEMORANDA TO THE PRESIDENT (2000). The options set out
included (1) intervention for rare instances of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes with particular
focus on genocide; (2) determination of strategic interests; and (3) evaluation of costs and consequences of
armed humanitarian intervention. Presidential Decision Directive 56, issued in May 1997, outlined the essential
features for intervention: U.S. interests, strategic purpose, scheme of operation, exit strategy combined with
agency coordination, and planning and development of the components of the mission. See id. at 85.
14. See Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999).
15. See RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY, REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 136-37
(2000). NATO members felt so strongly about the human rights violations in Kosovo that they took an un-
precedented action without the authority of the Security Council to evade an inevitable Russian veto.
16. See WILLIAM SHAWCROSs, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL, PEACEKEEPERS, WARLORDS AND A WORLD OF ENDLESS
CONFLICT 388 (2000). In December 1988, rebels in Sierra Leone abducted up to four thousand children and
killed at least two thousand people in a few days.
17. See id.
18. Interview by Susanna Lobez with Hilary Charlesworth, director of the Centre for International Public
Law at the Australian National University (July 9, 1999). The Portuguese still claimed sovereign ties to East
Timor territory. The United Nations did not recognize the territory as part of Indonesian territory and this
demonstrates that its status was not entirely fully part of Indonesia. In addition, the East Timorese had already
voted for independence (Australian Broadcast Corp. Radio interview on July 9, 1999).
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public demand and pervasive media coverage. Unfortunately, by the time public support is
mobilized, the early stages of humanitarian crises may have long passed. This was the case
in the 1994 Rwanda crisis.19
Preventing a crisis and avoiding the need of a humanitarian intervention require a so-
phisticated understanding of the countries, the political economy, the culture, history and
geography, along with some remedial early warning mechanisms, including extensive com-
munications facilities. Furthermore, the use of massive surgical air strikes, such as those
that occurred in Kosovo, is limited without thorough information about the country, and
for the most part, western powers have found little interest in Africa.o
Because of the lack of strategic interests, the fear of the Somalia syndrome, and sporadic
media coverage, the criteria for humanitarian intervention will most likely exclude Africa
from any further U.S.-led humanitarian intervention. The potential high costs and casualty
risks associated with any humanitarian intervention give plenty of reason to avoid such
endeavors. One can just look at the delay in responding to the Mozambican flood crises2
to appreciate that lack of international will and media attention to the human problems
in Africa.
Although in 1999 extensive resources were directed toward the military interventions in
Kosovo and East Timor, the available funding for humanitarian needs in Africa were only
half of the $800 million needed. In fact, Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned, "The
disproportionate international response to recent crises in Europe and Asia compared to
Africa was damaging the credibility of the UN."22 Therefore, if and when a decision is
required for an intervention to end massive human rights abuses, it may well matter on
which continent the violations are occurring and who will receive the requisite assistance.23
Since World War II and the culmination of the Cold War, the development of human
rights law altered the legal basis for protecting a sovereign and its territorial integrity. The
authorization for U.N. interventions and tribunals in the 1990s indicates that sovereignty
does not necessarily provide a shield from human rights abuses or from the compelling
need for humanitarian intervention.24 The secretary-general furthered this emerging prin-
ciple when he stated, "Leaders who abuse citizens can no longer escape reckoning by hiding
behind national sovereignty."" Thus, a change in perception toward abuses of human rights
19. See Miskel, supra note 11, at 3.
20. See id. at 4. See also Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? 93 Am. J. Irr'L L. 14 (1999).
Internal disorder and human rights violations are explained in terms of local nationalisms and power struggles
without reference to other causes of violence such as economic intervention.
21. See Rachel L. Swarns, New Flood Aid to Mozambique and Some Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000,
at 8.
22. Michael Fleshman, SharingAfrica's Peacekeeping Burden, 13 AFRICA RECOVERY 4, 5 (1999).
23. See Chinkin, supra note 20, at 24 (comparing funding). "UNHCR is spending about 11 cents a day per
refugee in Africa. In the Balkans, the figure is $1.23." T. Christian Miller & Ann M. Simmons, Relief Camps
for Africans, Kosovars Worlds Apart, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at Al. The United Nation's consolidated hu-
manitarian appeal for Kosovo is $690 million, of which 58% has been met, while $2.1 billion has been pledged
for regional construction. A U.N. appeal for Sierra Leone is $25 million and 32% has been received. See
Victoria Britain, Unrealistic Humanitarian, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 4, 1999, at 16.
24. See Antonio Cassesse, Ex inuria ins oritu Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 26 (1999). See also ANN MARIE
CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 23
(2001).
25. Barbara Crossette, Canada Tries to Define Line between Human and National Rigbts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2000, at Al l. Canada has set up a panel to study intervention and state sovereignty.
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allowed for the deployment of interventions without creating any firm norms about when
and where they might occur.
This article underscores that the international community increasingly views gross vio-
lations of human rights as threats to international peace and security and justifies these
violations to circumscribe the immunity of sovereign boundaries. It illustrates the evolving
international law for humanitarian intervention and reviews some of the more recent mul-
tilateral humanitarian intervention cases during the 1990s. The trend indicates that the
criteria for intervention are malleable when taking into consideration nation/state geo-
political interests. In view of the overall good that might be served compared to the risks
at stake, it is difficult to predict where and when the next intervention will take place. If
one looks at the past, it seems unlikely, regardless of moral imperatives, that an intervention
will take place in Africa.
H. Framework for Humanitarian Intervention
Historically, the development of the modern state system since the seventeenth century
emphasized the right of a sovereign and the right of complete authority within its territory.
2 6
This principle in international law clearly precluded the use of armed intervention as an
acceptable practice in world politics." Generally, legal theorists, divided as either classic
realists or liberal theorists, claimed that intervention invalidated the notion of national
sovereignty. The realists found that it represented disruption of the international order and
that it could only be justified in the most rare instances to restore order among states, not
necessarily to end moral injustices. On the other hand, traditional liberal theorists argued
that intervention foreclosed individuals' and groups' self-determination within states and
could only be supported to uphold those principles.2" Therefore, coexistence in the inter-
national system created a legal obligation and customary acceptance of nonintervention by
outside states in domestic issues.29 This norm formed the integral element for respect of
state sovereignty and its territorial integrity.
The nature of sovereignty has implied that no state has the right to impose its will on
the territory of another except in very narrow circumstances. The U.N. Charter embodies
this reverence for sovereignty. In article 2, the charter sets forth that it is based on sovereign
equality and prohibits member states from interfering in the territorial integrity of another
state30 except in cases of self-defense.' Under the charter, violations of sovereignty represent
26. See STEPHEN A. GARRETT, DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL: AN EXAMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION 49 (1999).
27. SeeJ. Bryan Hehir, Military Intervention and National Sovereignty, Recasting the Relationship 29, 30, in HARD
CHOICES, MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998).
28. See id. at 30.
29. See Richard Falk, The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the United Nations 31-32, in EssAYs ON
INTERVENTION (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1964). The nation state, however, has not served the common interest
of people and has even been one of the most important deprivers of human rights.
30. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2. Under article 2(1), "the Organization is based on the sovereign equality of all
its Members." Under article 2(4), "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 2(7) states, "Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state."
31. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (the right to self-defense).
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violations of global order. 2 In view of the intrusion that an intervention causes in a sovereign
territory, there must be very compelling reasons for its justification. In the case of Somalia,
one of the basic legal criteria for nonintervention did not exist because the international
community considered Somalia "a failed state."33
During the first forty years of the United Nations, spanning the periods of de-
colonization and Cold War rivalries, the general assembly endorsed a series of resolutions
calling for respect for sovereignty. These resolutions reflected many states' concerns about
outside forces' attempts to influence or intervene in their internal affairs. One resolution
in particular focused on a policy for nonintervention: The U.N. Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which
proclaimed, "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or the external affairs of any other State. '34 Thus,
the reluctance to intervene and to utilize extensive multinational machinery was partly due
to deeply rooted political sensitivities regarding threats to sovereignty.
Although respect for sovereignty remains an essential obligation among states, the su-
premacy of the sovereign has eroded due in part to changes in the global economy, the
expansion of technology, and the development of international legal commitments, par-
ticularly for the protections of individuals and groups. Sovereignty is increasingly viewed
as a matter of responsibility rather than of power 35 toward its citizens or toward its partic-
ipation in the international system. The expansion and incorporation of international hu-
man rights law into national law exemplifies this trend.
Beginning with the U.N. Charter, states have agreed that in their conduct they will
promote respect for and observance of human rights.3 6 In addition, human rights law has
set standards for a state's conduct, creating protections and imposing restrictions on the
treatment of people. Since a state is the essential institution for the effective implementation
and enforcement of human rights, the conduct of a state toward its nationals comprises one
element in maintaining international respect for its sovereignty.3' Thus, sovereignty is de-
fined in part by the human rights conditions in a country.38
Furthermore, U.N. human rights enforcement mechanisms dilute the supremacy of a
sovereign. Enforcement procedures may cause a sovereign to tolerate and to take remedial
action either in response to its own citizens submitting reports on consistent human rights
violations 9 or to specialists monitoring and investigating activities within their domestic
realm.4- Although these various procedures are timely and may not be appropriate for grave
32. See Kofi Annan, Peacekeeping and National Sovereignty, in HARD CHOICES, MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUM-
ITARIAN INTERVENTION, at 55, 56 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998).
33. See FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19
OF RESOLUTION 794, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (1993), at 9.
34. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123 (1970).
35. See Annan, supra note 32, at 57.
36. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
37. See Jack Donnelly, Social Construction of International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLI-
TICS 86 (Tim Dunne & NicholasJ. Wheeler eds., 1999).
38. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990).
39. See U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/RES/1 503 (1970).
40. Under the U.N. Charter there are specific provisions that provide for international interference in the
way a sovereign conducts its internal affairs. For example, U.N. Charter article 34 provides that the Security
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violations requiring swift action,41 they connote that sovereignty does not mean exclusivity
from foreign interference when it comes to human rights. In addition to intergovernmental
reporting procedures now in place through various conventions, the non-governmental
organizations (NGO) are increasingly able to assemble, interpret, and report on informa-
tion regarding abuses of human rights, making it almost impossible for a sovereign to escape
international notoriety and condemnation.
42
Although states may dispense of some rules of international law through agreements or
customary practice, there are some rules that they may never ignore. Such rules, known as
jus cogens, are those for which no derogation is permitted. These are known as rules of ordre
international public, rules of international morality, and are manifestly illegal under inter-
national law.41 Violations of human rights such as those against slavery, torture, and geno-
cide are violations ofjus cogens rules. In a separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in the
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, which was a case deciding whether the Security Council acted under
chapter VII when implementing the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, found that
rules considered to bejus cogens are superior to both customary international law and treaties
between and among states.-
In addition to rules of conduct that exist beyond a state's respective borders, there are
crimes for which there is universal jurisdiction to enforce regardless of territorial bound-
aries.45 After World War II and following the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
Council "may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise
to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security." Also, the Commission on Human Rights receives indi-
vidual communications on consistent violations of human rights and supports a program of advisory services,
including the special rappateurs. In addition, these major international human rights instruments provide for
monitoring and follow-up mechanisms: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Agenda Item 62, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (1966); the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Agenda Item 62, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200 (1966); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Agenda Item 58, U.N. Doe. A/RES/2106 (1965); the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda
Item 75, U.N. Doe. A/RES/34/180 (1979); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/39/46 (1984); the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989); and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (1990) (not in force). The Center for Human Rights carries out monitoringprograms
and training on human rights.
41. See K. Mills, Sovereignty Eclipsed? The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention, JOURNAL OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (1997), at www.jha.ac/articles/a019.htm. These enforcement mechanisms do work
in a timely, efficient, and consistent manner. These activities would be more properly called attempts to in-
terfere rather than an intervention.
42. See AN MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS 17 (2001).
43. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 164 (1999). In the 1986 Nicaragua case,
the International Court of Justice found that certain rules do not need to be examined because they express
deeply held and widely shared convictions about the unacceptability of the proscribed conduct.
44. See Mills, rupra note 41, at 3. Principles ofjus cogens have been codified in various treaties and conventions,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is binding on states as customary international law.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987). "Universal
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and the U.N. General Assembly, genocide and war crimes became crimes subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction. 46 States have accepted the universal jurisdiction because these crimes
pose a threat to each and every state and thus justify a global extension of the principle of
jurisdiction to all areas not covered by another states' jurisdiction. 47
Although the genocide convention 48 does not apply universal jurisdiction for offenders
of genocide, customary law provides for the universal jurisdiction for the crime of geno-
cide.-9 Furthermore, for grave violations of humanitarian law, the Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 for the Protections of Victims of War 0 contain common articles regarding grave
breaches, which in effect constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. Under these
articles, states are obligated to search for persons who commit grave breaches and bring
them to trial regardless of their sovereign links. Thus, sovereignty is not a guarantee of
protection for human rights violations, particularly grave violations.
During the last decade, the international community furthered the precedents of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the enforcement of the principles embodied in the genocide
convention and the Geneva conventions with the establishment of two international war
crimes tribunals. Despite the international community's intransigence to intervene to stop
grave human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the U.N. Security
Council created two international tribunals to address the atrocious crimes that occurred
in those places. The council justified its authority based on the fact that the human rights
violations posed a threat to international peace and security, triggering a chapter VII action,
and that the crimes committed were of an international concern regardless of sovereign
links.s The two tribunals have advanced international humanitarian law52 and broadened
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses." These offenses recognized by the community of nations as
of universal concern include piracy, slave trade, attacks or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, and war crimes.
46. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 15, at 75. The military tribunal at Nuremberg created legal history finding
that certain crimes were of such magnitude that they injured not only the immediate victims and not only the
people in the country but all humankind. The general assembly formally recognized the principles of the
Nuremberg Charter when it unanimously affirmed its substantive principles.
47. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 45.
48. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277. Article VI of the convention provides that the courts of the state in whose territory the offense was
committed shall try persons charged with genocide.
49. See The Legal Basis for the Establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993), at 9, T 35. The competence of the international tribunal is derived from laws that have "beyond
doubt become part of international customary law." Those conventions cited include the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948.
50. The Geneva conventions are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick, Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949; and the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949. Additionally, the
two 1977 additional protocols are (1) Protocol I, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict, Dec. 12, 1977 and (2) Protocol 11 Relating to Protection of Victims of Internal Armed Conflict, Dec.
12, 1977.
51. See U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 49, 10. 4. The Security Council determined that the situation
constituted a threat to international peace and security and stated that it was determined to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons responsible for the crimes (May 3 1993). Letter from the Secretary-
General to the Security Council for a Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994). The grave human
rights violated committed in Rwanda extend far beyond /Rwanda and are a matter of international peace and
security. See id. at 29, 138.
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the legal basis for removing the shield of sovereignty when serious human rights violations
are committed." The formation of an operating International Criminal Court would pro-
vide a further guarantee of these protections because it would not only provide an enforce-
ment mechanism but also act as a deterrent to would-be war criminals1
4
m. Justifying Humanitarian Intervention
Historically, Western legal tradition found that intervention contravened the principles
of national sovereignty and autonomy." On a practical level, however, economic, environ-
mental, and technological issues and obligations have altered historical territorial promi-
nence in the international system. Globalization has meant not only transformation of the
world economy but also an alteration of the competence of sovereignty and of the principle
of the nation state being the principal center of power. Furthermore, through the codifi-
cation, enforcement, and promotion of human rights and humanitarian law, protection of
individuals' and groups' rights received greater consideration in the international system.
In this regard, international organizations and states have gained more responsibility
toward protecting lives and toward delivering humanitarian assistance, even through mili-
tary means.
A. DEFINITION OF INTERVENTION
An intervention connotes an event or diversity of actions undertaken by a state or group
of states to impose the will of one state or group of states on that of another, usually by
coercion or the use of force.16 An intervention creates an interference intended to affect an
outcome of activities in another state. In this regard, an intervener needs to take into account
the diverse aims of those who created or allowed for the disastrous humanitarian situation
to develop."
The use of force employed to stop grave humanitarian situations such as genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity usually requires an armed humanitarian intervention."
It is an intervention because it entails sending military forces across the sovereign borders
of a country; it is humanitarian because it refers to situations that are morally wrong. The
purpose for the invasion into another states' territory should be to restore stability, the
absence of which threatens international security, and to save lives. In contrast, a multilateral
humanitarian assistance program requires an a priori agreement from the sovereign state
before operation.
In view of the intrusion it causes, a military intervention should proceed pursuant to a
mandate authorized through a multilateral agreement, specifically one by the Security
52. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 15, at 123.
53. See id. at 127.
54. See www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm, at 4. Effective deterrence is a primary objective of those
working to establish the international criminal court.
55. See Hehir, supra note 27, at 32.
56. See R. J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 11 (1974).
57. See David Keen, Incentives and Disincentivesfor Violence, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE, ECONOMIC AGENDAS
IN CIVIL WARS 19, 36-37 (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000).
58. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 13, at 3.
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Council. This arrangement may be one of the only legally or politically acceptable mech-
anisms for execution of a military intervention. In fact, if an intervention takes place through
a multilateral action, the public that is suffering may not even have considered the force an
intervention, and therefore, some of the potential domestic repercussions associated with
its use may not even exist. In fact, country nationals who are suffering from an illegitimate
sovereign may perceive a U.N. intervention as a contribution to the promotion of national
sovereignty in a deeper sense. 59
During the Cold War, ideological differences between the United States and the former
Soviet Union placed a premium on order and stability among friendly states and allies. A
threat to either ideological framework created a motivation for military interventions for
preserving the spheres of influence.60 At the same time, super power rivalries prevented the
U.N. Security Council from authorizing any collective actions to intervene for truly
humanitarian reasons. The United Nations could only condemn situations, even some of
the most deadly conflicts in Africa, such as in Angola, which remains beset by unrest and
violent conflict. Furthermore, the legacy of the interventions that did take place, such as
the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, continues as a basis for
caution in legitimizing the use of military interventions, particularly without Security Coun-
cil authorization.
B. CRITERIA FOR JUSTIFICATION
In light of historical abuse of intervention and the importance for preserving stability in
the international system, it is essential that states observe international standards for inter-
vention. Even when an intervention is carried out under the aegis of multilateral forces, a
set of norms is preferred to ensure and to maintain reliable consensus for support and for
a check against abuses. Therefore, perhaps except in a case to prevent genocide, only a
multilateral intervention is justified under international law.61
A unilateral intervention is usually considered unlawful unless authorized by the U.N.
Security Council.62 In view of the amount of resources required and the potential for risks,
a state's unilateral intervention is regarded with skepticism. 6 Often a state's unilateral in-
tervention for humanitarian reasons is a ruse for other political objectives. For example,
some past unilateral interventions that relied on humanitarian reasons but also served state's
interests were displacement of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, India's invasion of East
Pakistan in support of Bangledeshi independence, Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin in
Uganda, and the United States' actions in Grenada and Panama.
Although intervention has historically been considered a contravention of international
law, it has been tolerated in limited circumstances, such as in force majeure or for self-
59. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
60. See Hehir, supra note 27, at 34-35. See also Yvonne C. Lodico, A Peace that FeUApart: The United Nations
and the War in Angola, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE
1990's 103, 108 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
61. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 16, at 411-12. What is worse, inaction in view of genocide, or regional action
without Security Council approval?
62. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 1.
63. See THOMAS G. WEISS & CINDY COLLINS, HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES AND INTERVENTION 42 (2d ed.
1996). States are the most powerful actors in the humanitarian system and often the least predictable.
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defense.64 Objectives other than humanitarian, such as foreign intervention to protect so-
cioeconomic rights in states where civil and political rights are observed, violate the terri-
torial integrity and political independence of those states. The only exception is where a
government willfully fails to take action to prevent the starvation or death by disease of
the population.
Despite the various interventions that have taken place in the last decade, the norm for
authorizing a humanitarian intervention is not concrete. For the most part, criteria for
legitimizing an intervention are drawn from the normative theory dealing with "the just
war ethic. "'61 The framework for these criteria is moral,66 which creates a presumption
against use of force except for morally justified situations.67 Therefore, as a military inter-
vention, it must truly be humanitarian to be justified and aimed at stopping gross human
rights violations. In addition to moral criteria, the intervention must satisfy legal require-
ments pursuant to the U.N. Charter. Therefore, once a military enforcement action is
deemed morally necessary, the Security Council should provide its authorization. When
the council cannot act, the moral exigencies may compel timely action. In this case, there
still must be some collective consensus to address the urgency of the situation.
68
Justification for an international intervention requires an examination of the following:
the motives for ending gross violations of fundamental human rights, the exhaustion of
alternative remedies, an attempt to obtain approval from the state in which the intervention
is targeted, a proportionate use of force, and the relative disinterestedness of the intervening
state or states. It is essential that the motives be humanitarian; any collateral non-
humanitarian motives should not impair or reduce the paramount human rights objective
of an intervention. In assessing whether the motives of an intervention are genuine, a review
of its results provides insights. For example, did troops occupy the territory longer than
necessary, and did the intervener seek to dominate the target state in some way unrelated
to humanitarian concerns? The humanitarian rationale is also weakened if there were less
destructive means to protect the threatened population than those relied upon. 69 The final
test, of course, is whether and how human rights have been effectively restored as a result
of the intervention.
Before an intervention force is deployed, all diplomatic efforts, forums for dispute res-
olution, economic pressures, and appeals to international and regional organizations must
be explored. The military intervention should not be the action of first resort.
Once a decision for a humanitarian intervention is made, however, the interplay of the
principles of proportionality derived from the laws of war should be calculated. Propor-
tionality must be measured in terms of the size of forcible means used compared to the
human misery. The principle of proportionality, as taken from the classical theory of the laws
64. SeeD. W. BowET, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 87-90 (1958). When diplomatic interposition
is no longer viable, a state has a right to intervene by the use or threat of force for the protection of nationals.
If this action takes place in the territory of another state it must be exceptional in character.
65. Hehir, supra note 27, at 42.
66. See FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 111
(1988).
67. See Hehir, supra note 27, at 42.
68. Richard A. Falk, Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo, World Order and the Future of
International Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999). In reference to the intervention in Kosovo, it was justifiable
for the act perhaps even without Security Council authorization, but the intervention should then not have
been in violation of humanitarian law.
69. See id. at 34.
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of war, essentially means that a given action may be counted as ethical if the good it produces
is greater than its possible evil side effects. The idea of proportionality actually applies both
to the decision to use force (jus ad bellum) and to the ways in which it is employed once the
fighting starts (jus in bello).70
Also, in determining the necessity for an intervention, the proportionality component
may include a calculation of the moral imperative to fight evil over the possibility of other
deaths and sufferings, particularly of the intervener. In the case of Somalia, after Americans
witnessed the horrifying sight of the treatment of U.S. soldiers by Somali people, there was
an outcry that the humanitarian activities be terminated immediately. American support for
the involvement in Somalia rapidly dissipated once there was a tragic and humiliating loss
of American lives. Therefore, the proportionality component also takes into consideration
the acceptable military casualties of the intervener.
C. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In addition to satisfying the moral imperatives for a multilateral intervention, the legality
test is whether the intervention is linked to the common interest of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. Although the U.N. Charter calls for states to refrain from the use
of force and to respect territorial integrity under article 2, it provides under chapter VII an
exception to this principle when the Security Council finds that there is a threat to peace
and security. Once measures under chapter VII are approved, they supersede the restrictions
in article 2. Humanitarian intervention on the authority of the Security Council represents
the strongest safeguard against abuse of humanitarian intervention that the contemporary
political system provides. 71
For the Security Council to endorse an action under chapter VII, it must determine that
the situation constitutes a threat to peace and security before deciding on the type of action
required.72 In deciding whether the situation constitutes a threat to the peace, the primary
factors include the size and intensity of the conflict, the extent to which the conflict is
internationalized, and the violations of the purposes of the U.N. Charter, such as severity
of human rights violations." Thus, there are no hard and fast rules explicitly enumerating
what are threats to peace and security. It is also difficult to find an internal dispute that does
not possess a threat to broaden its impact and become internationalized. Thus, it is up to
the Security Council to decide on a case-by-case basis what it perceives as a threat and what
type of action it will authorize. The intervention in Somalia was the first time, and maybe
the last time, that the U.N. authorized an armed force to end severe human rights violations.
In addition to authorizing a U.N. intervention, the charter provides for regional orga-
nizations to take action as long as "their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. ' '74 Regional humanitarian intervention includes action by
70. See GARRETT, supra note 26, at 125.
71. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 4.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threats to peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression, and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security.
73. See Paul C. Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 345 (1983).
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, § 1. "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security."
Id.
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organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
For the most part, however, regional organizations have not had the institutional capacity
to take humanitarian intervention and usually one country bears a substantially larger bur-
den of costs.
An example of a regional African intervention is the intervention in Liberia. In Liberia,
a civil war began at the end of 1989; the war plunged the country into total chaos and
resulted in near genocide. As a result, refugee flows as well as the spread of fighting to
neighboring states made very clear threats to international peace and security. Even though
called on by many Liberians to do so, the United States did not intervene, seeing no stra-
tegic interest and claiming that it was an African problem to be solved by Africans. The
U.N. Security Council also failed to take action.
In 1996, Nigeria brokered a peace agreement to end the nihilistic civil war." As a result,
the ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Al-
though it was supposedly for monitoring a cease-fire, it clearly had to impose a cease-fire
first. The main basis 'ut forth for the intervention was humanitarian, including ending the
"massacre of innocent civilians," and this was generally accepted by the international com-
munity at least by acquiescence.7 6 In fact, the OAU, the Security Council, and the European
Community all supported the humanitarian outcomes of the intervention while simulta-
neously downplaying the fact that force was used. The general response to the actual in-
tervention has been very muted with little condemnation, and the Liberian people generally
supported the ECOMOG's intervention."
To defend the government in Sierra Leone from rebel forces, the ECOWAS also au-
thorized the deployment of regional forces. In 1991, a former corporal, Foday Sankoh,
launched his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces with guerilla forces from Liberia
to overthrow the government, which had been beset with corruption. The RUF forces
destabilized the country with terror, mutilating and killing rural civilians."s They also sought
to control the country's open-cast diamond mines-another one of the country's curses.' 9
The Sierra Leone government received no help from outside governments while the RUF
became even stronger and more ruthless. Another military coup took place, and the new
president hired a private mercenary group, Executive Outcomes (EO), to assist in securing
Freetown.ss In addition, the OAU and the ECOWAS sought to negotiate a settlement to
the conflict.
In 1994, the ECOWAS provided a mandate for the ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, to enter
and defend Freetown, which it did."' Later in 1997, the ECOWAS expanded the
ECOMOG's mission to ensure the implementation of an embargo against the junta. In
early 1998, carrying out its duties, rebel forces attacked the ECOMOG, which then
counter-attacked, leading to the expulsion of the junta.s2 In January 1999, rebels began an
75. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 16, at 306.
76. Miskel, supra note 11, at 16.
77. See id.
78. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 16, at 196.
79. See id. at 194 (demonstrating executive outcomes assisted the ECOMOG).
80. See id. at 197.
81. See id. at 198.
82. See U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (1998). The Security Council encouraged the ECOMOG to proceed in
its efforts. See also James Traub, The Worst Place on Earth, The New York Review of Books (2000), at 61, 62.
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onslaught in the capital, killing, raping and maiming thousands of civilians. Although Ni-
gerian ECOMOG forces fought fiercely and pushed back the rebels, they later claimed that
other countries would have to contribute and enforce a peace in Sierra Leone. The United
States with Great Britain led a peace effort and negotiated an agreement that included the
deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. 3 The international community, however, did
not at first support the mission wholeheartedly; only few countries with U.N. peacekeeping
experience were willing to send troops. This weak commitment toward ensuring an en-
during peace perhaps gave the rebels the wrong information about the international com-
munity's resolve to support peace efforts in Africa. As a result, the rebels attacked U.N.
peacekeepers and detained them. The situation remains tenuous at best: The RUF has not
relinquished control of the diamond mines, and cross-border attacks erupt along the bor-
ders with Guinea and Liberia. 4
D. MILITARY CAPACITY FOR INTERVENTION
Once the Security Council or another internationally accepted multilateral organ finds
that a humanitarian crisis threatens international peace and security and authorizes a mili-
tary intervention, there must be a force adequately prepared for a successful deployment.
A military force must possess the requisite readiness, sustainability, and modernization to
respond to the immediate humanitarian problems to achieve long-term results.8 A military
force entering into a hostile environment must first ensure that its soldiers possess the
requisite training, technical support, and weaponry to enter safely, to establishment lodg-
ments, and to ensure self-defense capabilities. 6 They must be prepared to defend not only
themselves but also civilians and to counter any indigenous forces that refuse to cooperate
with the motives of the force.s In this regard, it is a dismal but necessary reality to calculate
the potential and acceptable level of casualties to carry out the intervention, particularly
for the initial entry.
8 s
To ensure sustainability of the objectives for the intervention, the intervention force
should plan to install order after the interveners depart s9 This aspect includes a long-term
strategy in resolving the underlying political issues and institutions that allowed for human
suffering.9° In this regard, the intervening force should have a time frame for its occupancy
or an exit strategy.
The fighting between the rebels and the ECOMOG troops was fierce, and ECOMOG troops had carried out
a great deal of destruction to beat the rebels. During the final two weeks of fighting in 1999, the rebel forces
killed six thousand civilians, raped thousands of women, chopped off the hands of thousands more, and de-
stroyed most of the east of Freetown.
83. See U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1999/13 (1999). See also Traub, supra note 82, at 63. The mission tasks called
for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and U.N. monitoring of the plan and deployment of U.N.
personnel in key locations. The peace plan also provided for amnesty of rebel forces.
84. See Security Council 2000 Round-Up, U.N. Doc. SC/6987, at 5-6 (2001).
85. See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, SAVING LivEs WITH FORCE, MILITARY CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION 41-42 (1997).
86. See id. at 18.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 50.
89. See id. at 19.
90. See Walter Clarke, Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates, in LEARNING FROM SOMALIA, supra note 6, at 4.
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Despite holy intentions, a humanitarian intervention requires a highly skilled and
equipped military force. At first, combat troops should arrive to establish security sites,
including a safe airfield. The initial intervening force should probably deploy at least a
brigade, about 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, at any point of entry.91 Before reaching the people
in need of aid, this initial force needs to establish logistical support and a headquarters
capable of interacting with national command authorities. It must arrive with policy guide-
lines and precise rules of engagement to confront any armed threat to the principal mission
of promoting a secure environment for humanitarian relief.
The planning first requires an assessment of the requisite arrival time. To send a brigade,
it is estimated that for a crisis 10,000 kilometers away from the United States, it takes a
typical aircraft (for example, C-130 or C-141) about three days to make a complete round
trip.92 To deploy forces by sea, at least fifteen to twenty days are necessary to reach a given
country from the same distance. If the port of entry is vulnerable, then naval forces may
have to protect the ports with additional forces. The United States has the capability to
deploy more than two divisions of equipment to most parts of the world within several
weeks; at this time, no other country possesses this capability.9' For a forcible intervention,
only modest numbers of heavy forces with light weaponry are generally needed. For the
complex Somalia intervention, only light weaponry was needed;94 in contrast, the interven-
tion in Kosovo required heavy scale weaponry.
Once a military force has successfully intervened and succeeded in rescuing the popu-
lation, the more time consuming and frustrating, and maybe even more dangerous, part of
the intervention needs to take place-restoring structures for rule of law and sustainable
peace. The force's mandate must be prepared to establish local security forces and to create
an environment for judicial structures. In addition, full recovery will require a program for
demilitarization (including landmine clearing) and economic reconstruction. In view of the
comprehensive scope of the intervention, interventions should not take place in environ-
ments that cannot be stabilized and/or that might lead to a wider war.
E. CASES
1. Northern Iraq
In the beginning of the 1990s during the optimistic wave for a new world order, it was
believed that the international community could put an end to humanitarian tragedies and
maintain its objectives for peace and security. In 1991, the Security Council approved a
humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq to safeguard the Kurdish civilian population
from Iraqi treatment. The preamble to Security Council resolution 688 referred to the
exception of charter article 2(7) and declared that the consequences of the treatment of this
segment of the population threatened "international peace and security."95 Through this
resolution, the Security Council established a precedent and demonstrated that the misery
of a population is no longer deemed "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a
91. See O'HANLON, supra note 85, at 20.
92. See id. at 21.
93. See id. at 24.
94. See id.
95. S.C. Res. 688, U.N.SCOR, 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), at 1.
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sovereign.9 6 China, however, abstained on the vote for resolution 688, referring to the
"domestic jurisdiction" clause in article 2(7). 91
2. Somalia
In March 1992, the former director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
described Somalia as the "worst humanitarian disaster in the world." 9s Later in 1992, after
months of more shocking information about the starvation in Somalia, the United States
led support for Security Council resolution 794,99 which authorized the use of force under
chapter VII to end the starvation and disease. The Security Council declared that an en-
forcement action under chapter VII was needed to secure the environment for the delivery
of humanitarian assistance. Resolution 794 also called for the United States to command
the operation, which was called Operation Restore Hope. Although the United States knew
that warlords were fundamentally responsible for the widespread diversion of food, the
follow-up of the intervention did not incorporate the complexities and tribulations of So-
mali clan politics.
In March 1993, subsequent to the successful U.S.-led intervention to secure humanitarian
assistance, the Security Council authorized in resolution 814 the transfer of command from
the United States to the United Nations. This represented the first peace enforcement
carried out under the United Nations. In undertaking a complicated and ominous peace
enforcement mission, the United Nations had (and still has) little equipment and no troops
of its own. At the same time, however, the United States began the withdrawal of its soldiers
and resources, except for a small quick reaction force, for a targeted May 1 deadline. After
Somalia clans viciously attacked U.N. troops in June, the Security Council retaliated with
resolution 837, which called inter alia for the "arrest and detention for prosecution, trial
and punishment" of "those responsible for the armed attacks."' °° This expansion of the
U.N. mandate now comprised the hunting down of General Aideed. On August 8, 1993,
the United States suffered its first losses by the detonation of one its military police patrol
unit of four. The United States subsequently deployed a special force unit. Although this
force captured some of Aideed's aides, its operations were tragically terminated with the
loss of eighteen men on October 3, 1993.
In the aftermath of the loss of American soldiers, the United States significantly re-
trenched from its 1992 humanitarian pursuits. Instead, it issued presidential directive PDD
25, which delineated criteria for U.S. involvement in humanitarian interventions and es-
tablished inter alia that (1) there must be minimal risk of U.S. combatants; (2) there must
be an identifiable interests at stake; (3) the mission must be clearly defined in size, scope,
and duration; (4) there must be sufficient resources and political will to carry out the mis-
sion; and (5) there must be an identifiable "exit strategy" for the United States.' 0' The result
96. Id. Resolution 688 "insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organi-
zations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq."
97. See Mills, supra note 41, at 10.
98. See Press Release, Public Health Effects of Conflict, Somalia: No Mercy in Mogadishu. The Human
Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle for Relief (Mar. 26, 1992).
99. U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
100. Howe, supra note 7, at 181.
101. See JOHN A. AusINK, WATERSHED IN RWANDA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HUMANITAR-
IAN INTERVENTION POLcy 6 (The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown Univ. 1997).
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of this cautious and calculated humanitarian agenda was a decision not to intervene when
the mass killings began in April 1994 in Rwanda. °2
3. Rwanda
In the same month that the United States lost it soldiers in Somalia, the United Nations
established the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMIR) in Rwanda to monitor and
verify the principles of the Aretha Accords, signed in August of that year. 03 The mission's
mandate consisted of multidisciplinary components: political, humanitarian, and military.
Despite its broad goals, the UNAMIR suffered from severe shortages in equipment, per-
sonnel, training, and intelligence gathering.0 4 In addition, the personnel was inexperienced
in dealing with massive humanitarian crises. This situation undermined both the mission's
effectiveness in responding to the deterioration of the security situation and certainly its
ability to confront perpetrators of genocide. °s
During the period ofJanuary to March 1994, it became apparent that the implementation
of the Aretha Accords was not faring well and that there was a dramatic deterioration in
the security situation in Kigali. There was an increase in violent demonstrations, roadblocks,
assassination of political leaders, and assaults on civilians. These developments severely
over-stretched the resources and capabilities of the national army. Furthermore, extremist
groups had been disseminating information over the radio with the aim of spreading hatred
among the Hutus against the Tutsis.' °6 In mid-January, General Dallaire, the chief military
commander of the UNAMIR, requested permission to raid and disarm militia groups in
Kigali, based on information from an informant that some Hutu cells were preparing for
a massacre. The U.N. headquarters denied his request, stating that it would create hostility
within the Rwandan government. 07 The United Nations was put on further notice after a
delegation from the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva visited Rwanda and
warned the UNAMIR of the threat of ethnic killings. 08 Despite the forewarning of danger,
the international community appeared to be caught totally unprepared when the extremist
unleashed their mass army of killers and, in fact, seemed paralyzed to take any action.
On April 8, 1994, the systematic slaughter of Tutsis began and soon spread to outlying
areas as Rwandan radio called on Hutus to kill Tutsis. After the withdrawal of the Belgium
troops, the remaining UNAMIR peacekeeping forces fearfully became recalcitrant and
stood helplessly by as the killing escalated. By May 1994, up to 500,000 Rwandan Tutsis
had been massacred. Despite the escalating horrors in Rwanda, the international commu-
nity did very little to intervene. The U.S. government reasoned that it sought to avoid
another debacle of Somalia. It seemed, however, that other members of the Security Council
incorporated the same foreign policy agenda. As reports of genocide reached the outside
world, public outcry spurred the United Nations to reauthorize an empowered UNAMIR
102. See id. at 1.
103. Romeo A. Dallaire, The End of Innocence, Rwanda 1994, in HARD CHOICEs, supra note 27, at 73.
104. See id. at 74.
105. See id. "A central moral question still remains unanswered: did the ineffectiveness of the U.N. mission
in grasping the situation and poor handling of the political, humanitarian, and military response in extremis
abet the genocide? I believe that it did." Id.
106. See J. Mathew Vaccaro, The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Rwanda, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra
note 60, at 374.
107. See Dallaire, supra note 103, at 78.
108. RAK^YA OMAAR & ALEX DE WrAA, DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 666 (1997).
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on May 17. During the following month, however, the United Nations was unable to obtain
any substantial contribution of troops and equipment.
Given the general deterioration of the security prior to the slaughter, it seems that the
UNAMIR should have been empowered, its mandate broadened, and its rules of engage-
ment expanded to include the use of force. UNAMIR General Dallaire later said, "I came
to the United Nations from commanding a mechanized brigade group of 5,000 soldiers. If
I had had that brigade group in Rwanda, there would be hundred of thousands of lives
spared today."' ° Instead, when the killings erupted, mass hysteria ran unchecked and west-
ern powers evacuated their people. After Hutu extremists killed ten Belgian paratroopers
within the first twenty-four hours of the killings, troops from France, Italy, and Belgium
landed in Kigali and evacuated expatriates, and several hundred U.S. troops stood by in
Burundi to provide assistance. They left in the face of the unfolding tragedy with full
knowledge of an emasculated U.N. force with no defensive supplies, ammunition, medical
supplies, water, and only one phone line to the outside world.llo The Security Council
authorized France under chapter VII to lead its own intervention, Operation Turquoise,
but by the time it was deployed, most Tutsi had already been long dead. General Dallaire
later questioned why the French did not equip and help deploy the volunteer Franco-
African nations that were on record as standing ready to provide the UNAMIR with the
necessary troops."'
4. Haiti
In the same year of the genocide in Rwanda, specifically on September 19, 1994, the
United Nations authorized a U.S.-led multinational force (MFN) into Haiti. The inter-
vention, though comprised of military forces, did not require the destruction and loss of
lives that are usually associated with military invasions. The goals were to ensure the de-
parture of the military regime, to restore Haiti's constitutional authorities, and to establish
a secure environment for rebuilding the country."2 The process leading up to the human-
itarian intervention, however, began three years beforehand with the election of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president. After his election, the military
carried out a coup and forced Mr. Aristide into exile.
Following the coup, the OAS and the United Nations sought to diplomatically persuade
the military to restore Aristide. To enhance the diplomatic pressure, the United Nations
authorized an economic embargo against Haiti. Although humanitarian assistance programs
and human rights monitoring were deployed, the de facto regime viewed them as hostile
and supportive of the ousted president."3 The monitors became targets for reprisal by the
military regime and by angry citizens who felt victimized because of the embargo. It became
increasingly difficult for the international humanitarian assistance missions to operate, and
life threatening for the human rights monitors. Many Haitians sought to flee, creating a
politically volatile situation in the United States. The result was a flood of refugees heading
109. Id. at 654. William F. Schulz, Letter to the Editor on Rwanda, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 181 (Mar./Apr. 2000).
General Romeo Dallaire called for additional troops, but his recommendation was not related to all the Security
Council members.
110. See Dallaire, supra note 103, at 81-82.
111. See id. at 81.
112. See Colin Granderson, Military-Humanitarian Ambiguities in Haiti, in HARD CHOICES, supra note 27, at
99, 109.
113. See id. at 104.
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toward the southern Florida borders, creating a calamity of refugee policies from summarily
returning the refugees to containing them at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." 4 This ensured that
the United States would have a direct interest in finding a solution to the crisis in Haiti.
In October 1993, the United States first set out to deploy a humanitarian intervention
force. When an angry mob met them at the harbor, the United States pulled out the force
in an almost knee-jerk reaction to "the collective trauma in Somalia."' Meanwhile, the
humanitarian situation worsened and the human rights violations egregiously escalated,
requiring the United Nations to evacuate its monitoring mission. As the situation disinte-
grated, in 1994 the Security Council authorized U.N. humanitarian intervention under
chapter VII, having found a "humanitarian crisis" and a "climate of fear and persecution"
that was a "threat to international peace and security."" 6
Although the horrors of Rwanda may have influenced the Security Council from abstain-
ing and watching a decline of human rights, the debacle of the Somalia mission instructed
the United States that a withdrawal of a humanitarian mission requires a priori stability in
the country for sustainable peace-building and democracy initiatives. Therefore, the U.S.
humanitarian forces came equipped with police monitors, who were later deployed to vari-
ous arms of the government to monitor human rights. Also, unlike in Somalia, the United
States worked closely with the United Nations in preparing for the handoff from the in-
tervention force to the peacekeeping mission. In general, the intervention in Haiti was
considered a success. The special circumstances-such as Haiti's proximity to the United
States, lack of support for the de facto military regime, and the support from the Security
Council and the OAS-contributed to this achievement.
The intervention in Haiti demonstrated that states' self-interest could have a great influ-
ence in the decision-making process. The United States moved against Haiti because non-
humanitarian concerns balanced out with genuine human rights issues. Also, in terms of
the intervention in Haiti, President Clinton emphasized that Haiti was easily accessible,
that the country could be rescued with relatively little effort, and that there was a workable
international consensus."1 7
5. Kosovo
In contrast to the U.N.-authorized support for other collective humanitarian interven-
tions, the intervention in Kosovo took place outside the legal cloak of prior Security Council
approval.- The decision for the intervention took place after almost a decade of confront-
ing evidence of genocide and aggression in the Balkans. Despite the policies of imple-
menting a mixture of negotiations, peacekeeping missions, bombing of Bosnian Serb in-
stallations, a peace accord (the Dayton Agreement), and even a war crimes tribunal to deal
with the perpetrators of genocide, peace and stability remained tenuous. When the situation
in Kosovo began to unravel and it began to appear that once again genocide would
take place, it became evident for the U.S. and European allies that something had to be
114. See THOMAS G. WEISS, MILITARY CIVILIAN INTERACTION: INTERVENING IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES 177,
178 (1999). An estimated 60,000 to 100,000 fled from Haiti between 1991 and 1994.
115. Id. at 180.
116. Id. at 184.
117. Seeid. at 143.
118. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 401 Ith mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). The Security Council
subsequently affirmed the NATO's action, defining the Kosovo conflict as an international crisis and a threat
to peace and security.
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done.119 Although the United States pressed for negotiations at Rambouillet, the Serbs
perceived the tactics as an ultimatum to which they would not succumb. It appeared that
only military force could stop Slobodan Milosevic's campaign to destroy another peoples.
Thus, motivated by compelling humanitarian reasons, including genocide, the NATO pur-
sued its own humanitarian intervention outside the United Nations.
The intervention, however, may have established new precedents in international law.
Professor Louis Henkin suggested, "The NATO action in Kosovo, and the proceedings in
the Security Council, may reflect a step toward a change in the law.'' 0 The United States
and European countries would not have received authorization from the Security Council
despite a series of resolutions condemning the situation, so it was necessary to develop
an alternative collective mechanism under the NATO. 2' In addition to the decision to
use force, the means chosen employed also challenged principles in public international
law.' The use of air strikes for seventy-eight days may have violated international human-
itarian law.'
The intervention in Kosovo and follow-up enforcement mission has required and will
require extensive resources, in terms of peacekeepers, and infrastructure building. Although
the United States has long stated, after Somalia in particular, that there must be "a clear
exit strategy" before becoming engaged, it appears that this axiom was not a reality in
Kosovo in view of the history of ethnic hatreds in the Balkans. It will entail a long-term
commitment to install sustainable rule of law and respect for human rights. Nevertheless,
to preserve stability in Eastern Europe, laws were circumvented and significant resources
were tirelessly allocated. It is doubtful that such means would be directed toward solving a
situation in Africa.
6. East Timor
After adding East Timor to its list of non-self-governing territories in 1960, the United
Nations included the territory on its agenda. Although Indonesia integrated East Timor
into its territory by military force in 1974, the United Nations never recognized this as a
legal annexation of territory. Almost fifteen years later, the United Nations was able to
establish a mandate to give the people of East Timor the chance to vote on their self-
determination. After the vote on August 30, 1999, which resulted from a process of inde-
119. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 1. The dominant perception was that something had to be done, and
quickly, or else the Bosnian ordeal would be catastrophically reproduced with damaging consequences for the
future of Europe and the credibility of the transatlantic alliance with the United States. See also Stephen R.
Shalom, Justice and Humanitarianism, 28 NEw PoLITIcs 21, 22 (2000). The U.S. State Department noted
that Serbian forces dramatically increased their scope and pace of efforts, moving away from selective Kosovar
Albanian Liberation forces toward a sustained and systematic effort to ethnically cleanse the entire population
of Kosovo.
120. Henkin, supra note 14, at 5.
121. See id. at 4. As Kosovo illustrates, the Security Council may not be available to authorize a humanitarian
intervention when compelling human rights violations require action, "might we pursue an exception to the
veto, as regards to humanitarian intervention?" Id.
122. See Falk, supra note 68, at 33. One of the assessments that have to be made as a result of the NATO
initiative is whether "the humanitarian rationale is also sustained or undermined by the extent to which the
tactics of warfare exhibit sensitivity to civilian harm." Id.
123. See Belarus, India and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. SCOR Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/328 (1999) (demanding a cessation of the use of force).
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pendence, pro-Indonesia militias took revenge and launched a campaign of violence and
human rights abuses against the East Timorese.
International outrage combined with personal campaigns led inter alia by Nobel laureate
Jose Ramos Horta and threats to hold Indonesian leaders accountable by U.N. High Com-
missioner of Human Rights Mary Robinson2 4 provided further international support for
the United Nations to obtain the Indonesian government's acceptance of a multinational
force to intervene. On September 15, 1999, the Security Council authorized a chapter VII
peace enforcement intervention for a member state "to use all necessary means to restore
law and order" so that the international community could facilitate humanitarian assistance
and help the United Nations continue with its transitional government program.'25 The
intervention force, led by Australia, successfully carried out its mission and handed over its
command to the U.N. Transitional Administration, which has full responsibility for the
administration of East Timor during its transition to independence.
The intervention in East Timor took place under legal U.N. authority, that is, with
Security Council authorization. It seems that East Timor's situation had an advantage to
finally receiving rather prompt attention: proximity to Australia and that government's
support for an intervention, 2 ' continuous and accessible media coverage to the human
rights violations that caused public demonstrations,'27 and colonial links with a European
country forcing it to honor its residual responsibilities to stop the humanitarian disaster.2'
These factors helped to maintain pressure and international acceptance for the intervention,
which may not have happened in view of Indonesia's early intransigence to accept East
Timor's independence.' 2 9
V. Conclusion
As the last decade of the century demonstrated, humanitarian intervention by military
force has at least tacitly been accepted when there are gross violations of human rights that
threaten international peace and security. It also presents evidence, however, that the use
of the intervention is selective, not only due to the burden of proof for the legal justification
for an intervention but also because of the stakes and interests at hand.
As the intervention in Iraq exemplified, the states' interests in protecting the Kurds clearly
combined national and international security with human rights protections. In Somalia,
the motivation was principally humanitarian, but the dedication to the cause was ephemeral
and the execution was poorly planned. The result of the tragedy in Somalia caused a passive
reaction to genocide in another African country, Rwanda. The failure to respond to the
crisis in Rwanda leaves one to wonder about the available reservoir of humanitarian com-
passion when a catastrophe occurs in a small country with no strategic resources. Learning
from the failures of Somalia and Rwanda and taking into consideration its geographic
proximity to the United States, the intervention in Haiti was for the most part well planned
124. See Schulz, supra note 109.
125. See S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1264 (1999).
126. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 16, at 392. Australia and other countries began to call for an intervention.
127. See id. at 393. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Richard Holbrooke, feared that media reports about the
situation in Dili would recall images of U.S. inaction in the former Yugoslavia, or worse in Rwanda.
128. See id. at 393.
129. See id. at 392. Without Indonesia's consent for the intervention, the United States and China would
not provide the necessary votes on the Security Council for a chapter VII authorization.
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and executed. The crisis in East Timor gathered support for intervention, thanks in part
to European colonial and Australian geographic links. On the other hand, the Kosovo
intervention clearly shows the extent of resources that will be allocated to achieve objectives
when human rights violations threaten peace and security in Eastern Europe. In comparing
the international community's response to the situation in Kosovo to Sierra Leone, the
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "If Africans 'got the international support
that the people of Kosovo are now getting, Africa would have a real chance to turn
the corner." '130
In addition to states' interests in international human rights and security issues, there
are, of course, other players who influence a policy of intervention. Through the subjects
it deems to cover, the media provides a link for those who are suffering and plays an
important role in influencing a society's sense of moral outrage and decision to intervene."'
Furthermore, as pointed out by NGOs in their research, advocacy and aid delivery work
tirelessly to maintain the profile of human rights and humanitarian law protections. Even
individuals communicating through "an international electronic nerve system and at all
levels of international society"'32 through official and unofficial channels disseminate in-
formation on human rights. Thus, what a ruler does to his people can be swiftly revealed,
making it increasingly hard to claim untouchability. "'
In view of the political, economic, and military criteria for launching a humanitarian
intervention, a logical mechanism to enforce human rights violations would be the estab-
lishment of an international humanitarian force under the aegis of the United Nations.
This would mitigate the legal problems of circumventing the U.N. Charter, it would al-
leviate the costs, and most importantly, it could help to ensure some predictability and
uniformity for the justification and implementation of an intervention. The establishment
of such an intervention force, however, would legally require international ratification and
approval of Security Council members. If approved, it would then require adequate and
consistent funding and staffing on an international level. As the secretary-general's report
on peacekeeping warned, current peacekeeping operations need better training and quicker
response time.14
In addition to humanitarian crises due to civil conflict, future humanitarian tragedies in
the near future may result from environmental disasters, such as shortages of water, energy,
and food and/or other problems, such as the spread of disease. 35 These catastrophic situ-
ations can cause refugee flows that will create regional instability and threats of international
insecurity. This scenario will give further incentives for drawing up mechanisms for re-
storing order through military interventions.
Therefore, one likely mechanism that can be empowered and relied on is the one already
in place: the regional organizations. However, these, too, would need to be strengthened
130. Id. at 390.
131. Michael Ignatieff, The Stories We Tell, Television and Humanitarian Aid, in HARD CHOICES, supra note
27, at 287, 290.
132. Reisman, supra note 38, at 40.
133. Wars of Intervention, Why and When to Go In, THE ECONOMIST,Jan. 6, 2001, at 19.
134. See U.N. General Assembly Press Release, U.N. Doc. GA/9781 (Sept. 27, 2000), available at
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000927.ga9781.doc.html. The report on peacekeeping is referred to as
the Brahimi Report, named after former Assistant Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi who carried out
the report.
135. See Elaine Sciolino, 2015 Outlook: Enough Food, Scarce Water, Porous Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000.
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and monitored in terms of human resources, military equipment, and other intelligence-
gathering facilities. Although the ECOWAS deployed missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
it lacked adequate international support for its efforts and Nigeria protested that it shoul-
dered a lot of the responsibility, spending billions of dollars and losing hundreds of lives.
136
In recognition of the necessity to strengthen Africa's military response to its own crises,
as well as the lack of national resolve to deploy troops, the United States developed mech-
anisms to empower African regional military structures. In reaction to the U.S. experience
in Somalia and its failure to intervene in Rwanda, the United States established the Africa
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996. The ACRI assists African nations to respond to
humanitarian crisis and peacekeeping missions with training and equipment. Although the
ACRI is not a standing army, it has already trained and equipped an estimated force of
6,500 peacekeepers for rapid deployment. 37 In view of President George W Bush's pres-
idential campaign promise to oppose the use of American military power to intervene in
countries that do not affect America's core interests, 38 the ACRI can help to provide some
reassurance that countries in the region will be prepared to intervene when crises erupt.
If regional mechanisms were reinforced and prepared for an intervention, the deployment
of a regional force would need to satisfy international legal requirements. The execution
of a regional force would require a joint regional and Security Council authorization to
ensure that its objectives are legally and politically humanitarian. Some of the criteria the
Security Council should consider include the moral requirements for terminating the gross
human rights violations and the exhaustion of all other remedies. If the council did not
endorse an action, a regional organization could proceed under article 52 of the charter,3 9
provided the council did not specifically prohibit the action. Once the objectives of the
intervention force were met, the force would need to withdraw and hand the peacekeeping/
building aspects over to a force authorized under chapter VI' 40 of the charter.
To save resources (human and otherwise), African countries (regionally and individually)
should adopt preventive measures to impede disasters. In this regard, the Economic Com-
mission for Africa (ECA) has called for the transformation of Africa's economies. To reduce
the conditions that cause instability, the ECA calls for structural changes in agriculture,
investment in education, technology, and measures to tackle diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria. To implement these policies, the ECA places good governance
as the best facilitator for such transformation."'
The ECA's emphasis for good governance cannot be underestimated. Weak governments
mired with corruption combined with the lack of rule of law are more susceptible to coups
and civil violence. In contrast to the Cold War, the causes for civil conflicts are increasingly
less motivated by ideology and are more complicated since they are fueled by greed for
136. See Fleshman, supra note 22, at 5. See also Traub, supra note 82, at 63. During the deployment under
the ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, Nigeria lost more than a thousand troops, and it cost Nigeria about $1 million
a day.
137. See African Crisis Response Initiative: A Peacekeeping Alliance in Africa, available at www.clw.org/pub/
clw.acri.html (describing the background and purposes of the ACRI).
138. See Michael O'Hanlon, How to Keep Peace in Africa without Sending Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001.
139. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52. " Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional ar-
rangement or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security." Id.
140. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 3 3-36.
141. See U.N. News Service, May 7, 2001, www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page2.html.
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power and money. Although some conflicts may arise from one party seeking to take power
from another, the incentive for maintaining war gravitates toward economic gain by ex-
ploiting natural resources and by providing access to international black market networks.
Thus, the civil war becomes the instrument for enterprise and the perpetuation of violence
provides the means for accumulation of wealth.42
In more cases, the leaders of an uprising recruit armed gangs who have a vested interest
in carrying out the violence. These gangs target civilian populations, tending to create
widespread destitution, which itself feeds into more violence. 43 The difficulties in preserv-
ing peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia exemplify the difficulties of this depraved trend. In
view of these dire states of affairs, a military intervention for humanitarian reasons must be
rapid, well equipped, and adequately trained. In addition, an intervention must come pre-
pared to quickly terminate violent crimes against the civilian population for which there is
impunity. These types of situations further the argument for emphasizing the empowerment
of regional forces to address regional failed states and to stop the perpetrators of crimes
against the society.
With sporadic international will to intervene, regional organizations may be the only
alternative to ensure a reliable mechanism for the enforcement of human rights. Further-
more, the rapid deployment capability of regional military forces would serve as a deterrent
against rebel forces, preventing the entrenchment of a situation. Without any rapid inter-
vention force to timely halt suffering from the severe deprivation of basic human rights,
there may be no other appropriate help for innocent civilians. Countries outside the region,
particularly outside of Africa, may find that the country in which a violation occurs does
not serve any strategic interests, and therefore, its human afflictions might not justify
an intervention.
142. See Mats Berdal & David M. Malone, Introduction, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE, sUpra note 57, at 4.
143. See Paul Collier, Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE, supra note
57, at 91.
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